An Outline of Psychoanalysis

Part One: The Nature of Things Psychical

The purpose of this brief essay is to offer as it were a dogmatic conspectus of psychoanalysis by bringing together all its doctrines in the most concentrated and clear-cut form. Obviously, it is not intended to convert or to convince you.

The postulates of psychoanalysis rest on an immeasurable wealth of observations and experiences, and only the person who has repeated these observations on himself and others has set about being able to pass his own judgement on them.

Chapter 1: the Psychical Apparatus

Psychoanalysis makes a basic assumption, the discussion of which remains the preserve of philosophical thought, and the justification for which lies in its results. We know two things about what we call the psyche (or psychical life). Firstly, we know about the brain (nerve system), the physical organ and scene of the psyche; secondly, we know that there are acts of consciousness that are presented to us in their immediate form and that no description can bring us any closer to. Everything in between is an unknown quantity to us; there is no direct relationship between these two end points of our knowledge. If there were such a relationship, it would at most give us an exact location of the processes of consciousness, and would not in the slightest help us to comprehend them.

Our two hypotheses take these ends or beginnings of our knowledge as their starting point. The first hypothesis concerns localization. We suppose that psychical life is the function of an apparatus which, we say, extends spatially and consists of several pieces – pieces which we, then, imagine to be similar to a telescope, a microscope or suchlike. The logical extension of such a notion is, disregarding certain attempts already made to approach it, a scientific novelty.

We have come to know about this psychical apparatus by studying the individual development of human beings. We call the oldest of these psychical provinces or forces the *Es*; it contains everything that is inherited, everything present at birth, everything constitutionally determined – above all, then, the drives originating from the bodily organization, which here [that is, in the *Es*] find a first psychical expression in forms unknown to us.[1]

Under the influence of the objective external world around us, part of the *Es* has developed in a particular way. In its original capacity as a cortical layer it was equipped both with organs to receive stimuli and with apparatus to protect against them; but, since then, a particular form of organization has developed that mediates between the *Es* and the external world. We have called this zone of our psyche the *Ich*.

The Main Characteristics of the *Ich*

Due to the relationship formed earlier between sensory perceptions and muscular action, the *Ich* has control over voluntary movement. It has the task of self-assertion, and fulfils it with respect to the *outside* world by getting to know the stimuli there, by storing information about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation), and finally by learning to change to the external world in an expedient way to its own advantage (through activity). It also fulfils its task with respect to the *inner* world, that is, with respect to the *Es*, by gaining mastery over the demands of the drives, by deciding whether they should be allowed gratification,

by postponing this gratification until the time and circumstances are favourable in the external world, or by suppressing their excitations altogether. Its actions are directed by observing the tensions that are either already present in it or have been introduced into it. If these tensions increase, this is generally perceived as *unpleasure*, and if they decrease, it is perceived as *pleasure*. However, it is probably not the absolute levels of this tension that are felt as pleasure or unpleasure but, rather, something about the rhythm in which they change. The *Ich* strives for pleasure, wants to avoid unpleasure. An expected, foreseen increase in unpleasure is answered by a *fear signal*; its cause, whether it threatens from without or within, is called a *danger*. From time to time, the *Ich* dissolves its connection with the external world and retreats into the dormant state in which it makes extensive changes to its organization. We can conclude from this dormant state that this organization consists in a particular distribution of psychical energy.

The growing human has a particularly long period of childhood during which he is dependent on his parents. As a residue of this period, a special authority develops in his *Ich*, in which this parental influence continues to exist. We have called this the *Über-Ich*. In so far as the *Über-Ich* is distinguished from the *Ich* or is opposed to it, it is a third authority that the *Ich* has to take into account.

An action of the *Ich* is then fully apt if it simultaneously satisfies the demands of the *Es*, the *Über-Ich* and reality – in other words, if it can reconcile their demands with one another. The details of the relationship between the *Ich* and the *Über-Ich* become altogether comprehensible if we trace them back to the child's relationship with his parents. It is, of course, not only the personality of the individual parents that affects the influence they have over the child, but also the familial, racial and national traditions that they hand down, along with the demands of the particular social milieu they represent. During the course of the individual's development, the *Über-Ich* absorbs in the same way contributions from the later parental substitutes and other people who carry on having an influence, such as educators, public role models and respected social ideals. We see that, for all their fundamental dissimilarity,

the *Es* and the *Über-Ich* have one thing in common: they represent the influences of the past. The *Es* represents the influence of what is inherited, and the *Über-Ich* essentially represents the influence of what is taken over from other people; whilst the *Ich* is mainly determined by what we experience ourselves – in other words, by accidental and current events.

This general pattern of a psychical apparatus could also be applied to the higher animals, those that are psychically similar to humans. We can suppose that an *Über-Ich* is always present when there has been a prolonged period of childhood dependency, as with humans. One can't avoid assuming that there is a distinction between the *Ich* and the *Es*.

Animal psychology has not yet started to tackle the interesting problem that raises itself here.

Chapter 2: the Theory of the Drives

The power of the *Es* expresses the actual purpose of the individual's life. This consists of gratifying his innate needs. We can't attribute to the *Es* an intention to remain alive and to use fear to protect itself from dangers. This is the task of the *Ich*, which also has to discover the most favourable and least dangerous kind of gratification whilst taking the external world into account. The *Über-Ich* may assert new needs, but its main function remains the restriction of gratifications.

Drives are what we call the forces that we suppose to lie behind the tensions caused by the needs of the *Es*. They represent the physical demands on the psyche. Although they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they are conservative in nature; whatever state a being has arrived at, an urge emerges to re-establish this state as soon as it has been abandoned. We can, then, distinguish between an indeterminate number of drives; indeed, one does so in common practice. Significant for us, however, is the possibility of being able to trace this multiplicity of drives back to a few basic ones. We have discovered that the drives can change their aim (by displacement),

and also that they can replace one another, by the energy from one drive moving over to another. The latter process is still not well understood. After much wavering, we have decided to propose only two basic drives: *Eros* and the *destruction-drive*. (The opposition between the self-preservation and species-preservation drives, along with the other opposition between *Ich*-love and object-love, still falls within Eros.) The aim of the first drive is to establish and maintain ever greater unities, that is, 'binding'; the aim of the second is, by contrast, to dissolve connections, and thus to destroy things. In the case of the destruction-drive, we can also suppose that its ultimate aim is to convert the living into the inorganic state. Because of this, we also call it the *death-drive*. If we assume that the living appeared later than the lifeless and arose from this, then the death-drive fits into the formula I have mentioned, namely that drives strive to restore everything to an earlier state. We can't use this formula for Eros (or the love-drive). This would mean presupposing that living substance was once a unity which was then torn apart and now strives to be reunified.[2]

In the biological functions, the two basic drives work against one another or combine with one another. Thus the act of eating means destroying the object with the ultimate aim of incorporating it; and the sexual act is an act of aggression with the intention of creating the most intimate union. This way in which the two basic drives work with and against each other gives rise to the whole spectrum of life-phenomena. The analogy of our two basic drives leads us beyond the realm of the living to the diametric opposition between the forces of attraction and repulsion that dominates the inorganic world.[3]

Changes to the proportions in which the drives are merged have the most tangible consequences. A strong increase in the proportion of sexual aggression turns the lover into the sex-murderer; a strong reduction in the aggressive factor makes him timid or impotent.

There can be no question of restricting either of the basic drives to one of the psychical provinces. They have to be found everywhere. We imagine an initial state in this manner: all the available

energy of Eros, which we shall henceforth call 'libido', is present in the *Ich-Es*, which has not yet been differentiated, and serves to neutralize the destructive tendencies that are present at the same time. (We lack an analogous term to 'libido' for the energy of the destruction-drive.) It is relatively easy for us to trace the fate of the libido later on; it is more difficult to do so in the case of the destruction-drive.

So long as this drive operates within the individual as a death-drive, it remains silent; it only impinges on us when it is turned outwards as a destruction-drive. That this should happen seems to be necessary for the preservation of the individual. The muscle system serves this diverting of energy. When the *Über-Ich* is established, considerable amounts of the aggression drive are fixated within the *Ich* and act self-destructively there. It is one of the dangers to health that humans take upon themselves en route to cultural development. It is wholly unhealthy to withhold aggression; the effect of this is that the person becomes ill. The shift from averted aggression into self-destruction via turning the aggression against one's own person is often demonstrated by someone in a fit of rage in which he tears out his hair or punches his own face, in the process obviously wishing that he were meting out this treatment to somebody else. A degree of self-destruction remains under any circumstances within the individual until it eventually succeeds in killing him, perhaps only once his libido is used up or fixed in a disadvantageous way. Thus one can generally suppose that the individual dies of his inner conflicts – but the species, on the other hand, dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world, if this has changed in such a way that the adaptations it has made are not sufficient.

It is difficult to say anything about the behaviour of the libido in the *Es* and in the *Über-Ich*. Everything that we know about it is related to the *Ich*, in which the entire available amount of libido is initially stored. We call this state absolute, primary *narcissism*. It lasts until the *Ich* begins to invest its notions of objects with libido, to transform narcissistic libido into *object-libido*. Throughout the whole of our lives, the *Ich* remains the great reservoir from

which libido-investments are sent out to objects and into which they are pulled back again, in the same way that a protoplasm behaves with its pseudopodia. It is only when the individual is totally in love that the main quota of libido is transferred on to the object, and the object to a certain extent take the place of the *Ich*. One characteristic of the *Ich* that is important in life is the libido's *mobility*, the ease with which it passes from one object onto another. In contrast to this is the fixation of the libido on certain objects that often persists throughout one's entire life.

It is an unmistakable fact that the libido has somatic sources; that it streams from various organs and parts of the body to the *Ich*. We can see this most clearly in that portion of the libido that is described according to its drive-aim as 'sexual arousal'. We call the most prominent of these parts of the body from which the libido comes the *erogenous zones* – although, in fact, the whole body is an erogenous zone of this kind. The best information we have about Eros, that is, about its exponent, the libido, has been gleaned by studying the sexual function which, of course, coincides with Eros in the popular view, if not in our theory. We can form a picture of the way in which the sexual urge, which is destined to have a decisive influence on our life, gradually develops from the successive contributions from several partial drives, all of which represent particular zones.

Chapter 3: the Development of the Sexual Function

According to the popular view, human sexual life essentially consists of the urge to bring our own genitals into contact with those of someone of the opposite sex. Kissing, looking at, and touching this other body appear in the process as concomitant and introductory acts. This urge is supposed to appear at puberty, that is, at the age of sexual maturity, and is supposed to serve reproduction. Nevertheless, we have always known certain facts that don't fit into this narrow purview.

1) It is odd that there are people who are attracted only to individuals of their own sex and with their own type of genitals.
2) It is equally peculiar that there are people – we call them perverts – whose desires behave just like the sexual ones but which ignore the sexual organs or their normal use.
3) And, finally, it is striking that some children demonstrate a very early interest in their genitals and signs of arousal in them. They are said to be degenerate because of this.

It is understandable that psychoanalysis aroused a stir and provoked denials when, partly on the basis of these three disregarded facts, it contradicted all the popular opinions about sexuality. Its main results are as follows:

a) Sexual life doesn't bide its time until puberty, but starts to manifest itself very clearly soon after birth.
b) It isn't necessary to draw a sharp distinction between the terms 'sexual' and 'genital'. The former is the broader term and encompasses many activities that have nothing to do with the genitals.
c) Sexual life encompasses the function of obtaining pleasure from zones of the body, a function which is later put into the service of reproduction. These two functions are often not necessarily mutually inclusive.

We are, of course, mainly interested in the first assertion, the most unexpected of them all. It has been demonstrated that there are signs of physical activity in early childhood to which only an old prejudice could deny the name sexual, and that are connected with the kinds of psychical phenomena that we later find in adult love-life such as, say, the fixation on particular objects, jealousy, or suchlike. Beyond this, however, it is evident that these phenomena are part of a natural and orderly development: they emerge in early childhood and invariably increase, reaching a climax somewhere around the end of the child's fifth year, before taking a break. During this break, everything stands still: much is unlearnt and recedes

again. Once this so-called latency period has run its course, sexual life advances into puberty – we could say that it comes into bloom again. Here we come up against the fact that sexual life begins in two phases – something that is only known in humans, and something that is clearly very important for the process of becoming human.[4] It is not a matter of indifference that the events of this early period of sexuality, give or take a few residua, fall victim to infantile amnesia. Our insights into the aetiology of the neuroses and our technique of analytical therapy are derived from these views. Tracing the developmental processes of this early period has also offered evidence for other hypotheses.

The first organ that appears from birth onwards as an erogenous zone and makes a libidinous claim on the psyche is the mouth. All psychical activity is initially directed at obtaining gratification of this zone's needs. Of course the mouth, with its function of providing nourishment, primarily serves self-preservation, but we ought not to confuse physiology with psychology. A need for gratification manifests itself early on, in the child's stubborn and persistent sucking; a need that – although it comes from and is stimulated by the taking in of nourishment – is nevertheless independent of nourishment and strives to gain pleasure. Because of this it can and should be called sexual.

During this oral phase, sadistic impulses already begin to occur sporadically with the cutting of teeth. This happens to a much greater extent in the second phase, which we called the sadistic-anal one, because here gratification is sought in aggression and in the excretory function. We base the right to mention the aggressive urges under the heading 'libido' on the view that sadism is a drive-blending of purely aggressive and purely destructive urges; a blending that will persist from now on for the rest of the person's life.[5]

The third phase is the so-called phallic phase; this is, as it were, a forerunner to the final form taken by sexual life, and is already very similar to it. It is worth noting that it is the male member (phallus) alone that plays a role here, rather than the genitals of both sexes. The female genitals remain unrecognized for a long

time to come; in its attempt to understand the sexual processes, the child clings devotedly to the venerable cloacal theory which is, genetically speaking, entirely justified.[6]

With and during the phallic phase, early childhood sexuality reaches its climax – and approaches its decline. From now on, boys and girls have separate fates. Both have begun to place their intellectual activity in the service of sexual investigation; both take as their starting point the assumption that a penis is universally present. Now, though, the paths taken by the sexes diverge from one another. The boy enters the Oedipal phase: he begins to manipulate his penis whilst fantasizing about using it in some sexual way on his mother – until he sees that girls have no penis and this, combined with a castration threat, causes him to experience the greatest trauma of his life, which ushers in the latency period with all its consequences. After a vain attempt to do the same as the boy, the girl comes to recognize her lack of a penis or, rather, the inferiority of her clitoris. This has permanent consequences for her character-development; as a result of this first disappointment in rivalry she often initially rejects sexual life altogether.

It would be a mistake to believe that these three phases are smoothly replaced by each other. The one appears in addition to the other; they overlap; they exist alongside one another. In the early phases, the individual partial drives embark upon their search for pleasure independently of one another; the phallic phase marks the beginnings of an organization that subordinates the other urges to the primacy of the genitals and signifies the beginning of the general striving for pleasure being categorized as belonging to the sexual function. The complete organization of a fourth, genital, phase is only achieved at puberty. Then, we find a state in which

1) some earlier libido investments have remained intact;
2) others are taken up into the sexual function as preparatory, supporting actions, the gratification of which creates so-called fore-pleasure;
3) other urges are excluded from the organization either by being completely suppressed (repressed) or by being used

in some other way in the *Ich*, to create character traits, to undergo sublimation with displaced aims.

This process is not always performed flawlessly. The inhibitions in its development express themselves as the manifold disruptions to sexual life. In these circumstances, fixations of the libido on states from earlier phases are then evident; their urges, which are independent of the normal sexual aim, are called *perversions*. One example of such inhibited development is homosexuality, if it is manifest. Analysis demonstrates that a homosexual object-attachment was present in all cases and, in most cases, has also been *latently* retained. The circumstances are complicated by the fact that the processes necessary to bring about the normal outcome are usually neither, say, fully completed nor entirely lacking, but are *partially* completed so that the final outcome is dependent on these *quantitative* relations. The genital organization is then indeed achieved, but is weakened by the portions of the libido that have not made the transition and have remained fixated on pre-genital objects and aims. This weakening shows itself in the libido's inclination, in cases where it obtains no genital gratification or where it experiences objective difficulties, to return to its early, pre-genital investments (regression).

While studying the sexual functions we were able to come to an initial, provisional conviction or – more correctly speaking, a suspicion – that we had made two discoveries that would turn out to be important in this sphere as a whole. First, we saw that the normal and abnormal phenomena that we were observing (that is, their phenomenology) demand to be described from dynamic and economic points of view (in our case, this means from the point of view of the quantitative distribution of the libido); and second, we say that the aetiology of the sorts of disorder that we study is to be found in the history of the individual's development – that is to say, in his early years.

Chapter 4: Psychical Qualities

We have described the structure of the psychical apparatus, the energies or forces that are at work in it, and we have used a prominent example to trace the ways in which these energies, mainly the libido, organize themselves into a physiological function that serves the preservation of the species. There was nothing in this that represented the quite unique character of what is psychical apart, of course, from the empirical fact that the functions that we call our psyche are based on this apparatus and these energies. We shall now turn to something that is characteristic of the psyche alone, indeed, something that, according to a most widespread belief, coincides with it to the exclusion of all else.

The starting point of this investigation is the unparalleled fact of consciousness, which defies all explanation and description. Undefinable and inexplicable it may be, but if we speak of consciousness then we none the less immediately know from our own most personal experience what is meant by it.[7] Many people, both within and outside science, are content to suppose consciousness alone to be the psychical thing, and in this case there remains nothing for psychology to do other than to distinguish between perceptions, feelings, thought processes and acts of will within the psychical phenomena. However, according to general consensus, these conscious processes don't in fact form a seamless, self-contained sequence – so the only thing that remains for us is to assume that physical or somatic processes accompany the psychical ones, processes which, we must grant, are more complete than those in the psychical sequences, since a few of them have parallel conscious processes, though others don't. Of course, it then seems obvious to place psychological emphasis on these somatic processes; to recognize in them what is really psychical, and to look for another way to evaluate the conscious processes. Most philosophers, along with many others, now resist this, and declare the idea of something being simultaneously unconscious and psychical to be nonsense.

However, it is precisely this that psychoanalysis has to do, and this is its second fundamental assumption. It declares that the allegedly somatic 'accompanying processes' are the really psychical things and, by doing so, initially disregards the quality of consciousness. It is not alone in this. Some thinkers such as Theodore Lipps, for example, have said the same thing in more or less the same words, and the general dissatisfaction with the normal view of things psychical has led to ever more urgent demands for the concept of the unconscious to be adopted by psychological thought – although these demands have been made in such an indefinite and obscure manner that they could have no influence on science.

Now, it would seem that this difference between psychoanalysis and psychology concerned nothing more than a trifling question of definition; a question as to whether the name 'psychical' should be applied to the one or the other sequence. In fact, this step has become highly significant. Whereas in the psychology of consciousness people never got beyond those incomplete sequences that were clearly dependent on something else, the other view – that the psychical is in itself unconscious – has allowed psychology to develop into a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those of other sciences – of, say, chemistry or physics – but it is possible to establish which laws they obey, to trace their mutual relationships and interdependencies seamlessly over long stretches; in other words, to reach what one calls an 'understanding' of the relevant area of natural phenomena. This can't happen without our making assumptions and creating new terms – but these should not be despised as testifying to any embarrassment on our part. On the contrary, they should be treasured as an enriching of science; they have as much claim to 'approximate value' status as the corresponding working premisses have in other sciences; they can expect to be amended, corrected and fine tuned after we have accumulated and sifted through further experiences. It is then also quite in keeping with our expectations that the fundamental terms and principles of the new science (drives, nervous energy et al.) remain

for a long time as obscure as those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction).

All sciences are based on observation and experience that are mediated by our psychical apparatus. However, as our science takes this apparatus itself as an object, the analogy ends here. We make our observations by means of the same perception apparatus, precisely with the help of the gaps in what is psychical, by using the obvious conclusions to elaborate on what is omitted, and by translating these omissions into unconscious material. Thus we construct as it were a sequence of conscious events in addition to the unconscious psychical processes. The relative certainty of our knowledge of the psyche is based on the binding force of these conclusions. Anyone who immerses himself in this work will find that our technique withstands every criticism.

In the course of this work, those distinctions that we call psychical qualities force themselves upon our notice. We don't need to characterize what we call 'conscious': it is the same as the consciousness of philosophy and popular opinion. Everything else that is physical is, for us, the unconscious. We are soon led to postulate an important distinction within this unconscious. Some processes can become conscious easily; they may then cease to be conscious, but can become so again with no trouble; they can, as we say, be reproduced or remembered. This reminds us that consciousness is only ever a very fleeting state. Anything that is conscious is only conscious for a moment. If our perceptions don't confirm this, then that is only an apparent contradiction; it stems from the fact that the stimuli that lead to perception can last for a long time so that, meanwhile, the perceptions may be repeated. The entire state of affairs becomes clear in the conscious perception of our thought processes: they may indeed persist, but they may just as easily disappear in the blink of an eye. Everything unconscious that behaves in this manner, that can so easily exchange the unconscious state for the conscious one, we thus prefer to call 'capable of becoming conscious', or *preconscious*. Experience has taught us that there is hardly any psychical process that is so complicated that it could not occasionally

remain preconscious, even if it usually presses, as we say, to become conscious.

Other psychical processes and material don't enter the consciousness so easily, but have to be deduced, guessed at, and translated into conscious expression in the manner described. For these, we reserve the name of the actual unconscious. We have, then, attributed three qualities to the psychical processes: they are either conscious, preconscious, or unconscious. The differentiation between the three categories of material that bear these qualities is neither absolute nor permanent. Something preconscious becomes, as we have seen, conscious without our being involved; and the unconscious can, through our efforts, be made conscious, whereby we may have the sense that we are often overcoming very strong resistances. If we try to do this with another individual, we mustn't forget that the conscious filling of the gaps in his perception, the interpretation that we present to him, doesn't yet mean that we have made the relevant unconscious material conscious in his case. This material is, rather, initially present in him in a two-fold fixation: firstly, in the conscious reconstruction he has heard and, in addition to this, in its original, unconscious state. Our continued efforts mostly succeed in making him conscious of this unconscious material himself, as a result of which both fixations coincide. The degree of effort by which we estimate resistance against the material coming to consciousness differs depending on the individual case. For example, something that is the result of our efforts in analytical treatment can also occur spontaneously; material that is otherwise unconscious can transform itself into something preconscious and can then become conscious, as happens on a large scale in psychotic states. We infer from this that upholding certain inner resistances is a condition of normality. Such a reduction of resistances and the resultant clamouring of unconscious material frequently takes place while we are asleep and thus establishes the conditions under which dreams can be formed. The reverse can also happen: preconscious material can become inaccessible, cut off by resistances – as is the case when we temporarily forget something or when it just escapes our memory. Alternatively, a preconscious thought can even be

temporarily transferred back into the unconscious state; this seems to be the pre-condition for jokes. We shall see that a similar transformation of preconscious content (or processes) back into the unconscious state plays a major role in the causation of neurotic disturbances.

Portrayed in this generalized and simplified form, the theory of the three qualities of things psychical seems to be a source of immense confusion rather than a step towards an explanation. But we mustn't forget that it is in fact not a theory at all but a first report on the facts that we have observed; that it sticks as closely as possible to these facts and makes no attempt to explain them. The complications that it reveals may make people understand the particular difficulties that our research has to struggle with. However, this theory will presumably also be made more accessible to us if we trace out the relationships that arise between the psychical qualities and the provinces or forces that we have supposed to be part of the psychical apparatus. These relationships are, though, anything other than simple.

The process of becoming conscious is above all connected to the perceptions that our sense-organs receive from the external world. From a topographical point of view, therefore, it is a phenomenon that occurs in the outermost cortex of the *Ich*. It is true that we also receive conscious information from within the body – the feelings, which have even more of a domineering influence on our psyche than external perceptions; and, moreover, under certain circumstances the sense-organs also deliver feelings and sensations of pain outside their specific perceptions. Since, however, these sensations – as we call them, in order to distinguish them from conscious perceptions – at the same time emanate from the terminal organs, which we regard as extensions or offshoots of the cortical layer, we can still maintain the above assertion [that is, the one at the start of this paragraph]. The sole difference would be that the body itself would replace the external world so far as the terminal organs of sensation and feeling are concerned.

Processes on the periphery of the *Ich* as conscious, and all other processes in the *Ich* as *un*conscious: this would be the most simple

idea that we could imagine. It may really be so in the case of animals – but, in the case of humans there is an added complication: the inner processes of the *Ich* can also acquire the quality of consciousness. This is the function of language, which firmly connects the material within the *Ich* with memory traces of visual or, more particularly, acoustic perceptions. From then onwards, the perceiving periphery of the cortical layer can also be excited from within to a far greater extent; inner processes such as those of imagination and thought can become conscious, and a special device is needed in order to distinguish between the two possibilities, namely *reality testing*. It has become invalid to equate perception with reality (the external world). Errors which can now easily occur, and frequently do so in dreams, are called *hallucinations*.

The interior of the *Ich*, which above all encompasses the thought processes, has the quality of precociousness. This is characteristic of the *Ich*; it is its sole prerogative. However, it would not be right to turn the connection with the memory traces of language into a pre-condition of the preconscious state; rather, this state is independent of these memory traces, even though the fact of language allows us to draw confident conclusions as to the preconscious nature of the process. Yet the preconscious state, distinguished on the one hand by its access to consciousness and on the other hand by its link with language traces, is still something special; its nature doesn't simply consist of these two characteristics. The proof for this is that large portions of the *Ich*, and above all of the *Über-Ich*, whose preconscious character can't be denied, still mostly remain unconscious in the phenomenological sense. We don't understand why this should be the case. The real nature of the preconscious is a problem that we shall try to tackle later.

The unconscious is the quality that reigns supreme in the *Es*. *Es* and unconscious belong just as intimately together as *Ich* and preconscious; indeed, the relationship between the former pair is even more exclusive. A review of the developmental history of an individual and his psychical apparatus allows us to establish that there is a significant distinction within the *Es*. Originally, *everything* was *Es*; the *Ich* grew up from the *Es* due to the constant

influence of the external world. During the course of this long development, certain things within the *Es* were transformed into the preconscious state and were thus absorbed into the *Ich*. Other things remained unchanged within the *Es* as its barely accessible core. But as things took their course, the young and weak *Ich* dropped certain material that it had already adopted, transferred it back into the unconscious state, and behaved in the same way towards some new impressions that it could have adopted – so that these, finding themselves repulsed, could leave a trace only in the *Es*. Bearing its genesis in mind, we call this last part of the *Es* the *repressed*. It doesn't really matter that we can't always clearly distinguish between the two categories in the *Es*. They more or less coincide with the distinction between what it originally brought with it, and what it acquired while the *Ich* was developing.

If, however, we have decided to undertake a topographical analysis of the psychical apparatus into *Ich* and *Es*, which runs parallel to the distinction between the qualities of preconscious and unconscious, and if we want to take this quality only as a *sign* of a difference rather than as the essence of it – then what is the actual nature of the state that betrays itself in the *Es* through the quality of unconsciousness and in the *Ich* through that of preconsciousness? And wherein lies the difference between the two?

Now, we know nothing about this; and our paltry insights figure very pitifully in comparison with the deeply obscure ignorance that lies behind them. Here, we have approached the actual secret of things psychical, as yet unrevealed. We suppose, as we are accustomed to do in the other sciences, that a kind of energy is at work in the psyche, but we lack anything to go on that will enable us to approach an understanding of it by analogies with other forms of energy. We believe we can see that nervous or psychical energy is present in two forms; one freely flowing and the other, by comparison, bound; we speak of material being invested and hyper-invested with energy; and even venture the supposition that a 'hyper-investment' establishes a kind of synthesis of different processes, in which free energy is converted into bound energy. We have got no further than this. All the same, we remain firmly of the opinion

that the difference between the unconscious and conscious states lies in dynamic relationships such as these, from which it would be possible to derive an explanation for the way in which one can be converted into the other either spontaneously or with our being involved in some way.

Behind all this insecurity, however, there lies a new fact: one which was discovered thanks to psychoanalytical research. We have found that the processes in the unconscious or in the *Es* obey different laws from those in the preconscious *Ich*. We call these laws as a whole the *primary process*, as opposed to the *secondary process* which governs the pattern of things in the preconscious, in the *Ich*. Thus the study of the psychical qualities has, it would seem, ultimately proved itself to be fruitful after all.

Chapter 5: Explanatory Notes Concerning the Interpretation of Dreams

Imagine an investigation of normal, stable states, in which the barriers of the *Ich* against the *Es* have remained secure and unruffled by resistances (opposing investments) and in which there is no difference between the *Ich* and *Über-Ich* because they are working in harmony with one another. Well, such an investigation would not be in the slightest bit enlightening. States of conflict and turbulence alone can further our knowledge, if the material of the unconscious *Es* has the prospect of penetrating the *Ich* and thrusting itself into consciousness – and if the *Ich* renews its stand against this attack. Only under these conditions can we make the observations that confirm or correct our assertions about the two partners. Our nightly sleep, however, is just such a state and because of this, the psychical activity during sleep, which we perceive as dreams, is also our most promising object for study. Moreover, by studying dreams, we will also avoid the oft-repeated accusation that we base our picture of the normal psyche on our findings in pathology; for dreams frequently occur in the lives of normal people, however much their characteristics may also differ from what we produce

when we are awake. As is generally known, dreams can be confused, incomprehensible, practically nonsensical; what they say may contradict everything we know about reality: and we behave like insane people so long as we are dreaming, by attributing objective reality to the contents of a dream.

We set about understanding ('interpreting') the dream by supposing whatever we remember of a dream when we wake up not to be the real dream process but just a façade that hides this real process. This is what we mean when we differentiate between the *manifest* dream content and the *latent* dream thoughts. We call the process that allows the former to proceed from the latter the *dream-work*. The study of the dream-work uses an excellent example to teach us how unconscious material from the *Es* – both originally unconscious and repressed unconscious material – forces itself upon the *Ich*, becomes preconscious and, as a result of the *Ich*'s opposition, undergoes that transformation which we know as *dream-distortion*. There are no features of a dream that could not be explained in this way.

It is best to start by saying that dreams are formed for two different reasons. Either a drive-impulse that is otherwise suppressed (that is, an unconscious wish) has found the strength while the individual is asleep to assert itself within the *Ich*; or an urge left over from waking life, a preconscious train of thought with its concomitant conflicting impulses, has been reinforced during sleep by an unconscious element. In other words, dreams originate from the *Es* or the *Ich*. The mechanism for dream-formation is the same in both cases, as is the dynamic pre-condition. The *Ich* proves its later derivation from the *Es* by abandoning its functions from time to time and allowing things to revert to an earlier state. This happens, correctly speaking, by the *Ich* breaking off its relationships to the external world and withdrawing from the sense-organs whatever it has invested in them. We are quite justified in saying that, at birth, a drive arises to return to the intra-uterine life we have given up – a drive to sleep. Sleep is a return to the womb of this kind. As the *Ich* governs motility when it is awake, this function is paralysed during sleep, and a good deal of the inhibitions that were

imposed on the unconscious *Es* accordingly becomes superfluous. The withdrawal of these 'opposing investments' allows the *Es* a measure of freedom that is now harmless. There is rich and compelling evidence for the part played by the unconscious *Es* in dream-formation.

a) The dream memory is far more extensive than the memory in waking life. Dreams produce memories that the dreamer has forgotten, which would be inaccessible to him while he was awake.

b) Dreams make unlimited use of linguistic symbols, the meaning of which the dreamer mostly doesn't understand. However, we can draw on our experience to say what they mean. They probably come from earlier phases of language development.

c) The dream memory very often reproduces impressions from the dreamer's early childhood. We can say for certain that these had not only been forgotten but had been made unconscious because of repression. The help – mostly indispensable – that dreams afford us when we try to reconstruct the dreamer's childhood in the analytical treatment of neuroses is based on this.

d) In addition to this, dreams bring material to light which can come neither from the dreamer's mature life nor from his forgotten childhood. We are forced to regard this as part of an *archaic* inheritance that the child, influenced by the experiences of his forebears, brings into the world with him prior to having any experiences of his own. We then find the counterparts to this phylogenetic material in the earliest legends of mankind and in surviving customs. Thus dreams become a source of human prehistory that we should not dismiss out of hand.

However, what makes dreams so invaluable in giving us an insight into the psyche is the circumstance that, if the unconscious material penetrates the *Ich*, it brings its own ways of working along with

it. I mean by this that the preconscious thoughts in which this unconscious material has found its expression are treated during the course of dream-work as if they were unconscious parts of the *Es*; and in other cases of dream-formation, the preconscious thoughts, which have garnered strength from the unconscious drive-impulse, are reduced to the unconscious state. Only in this way do we discover which the rules governing the course of events in the unconscious are, and what distinguishes them from the rules we are familiar with in waking life. Dream-work is, then, essentially a case of the unconscious dealing with preconscious thought processes. To take an analogy from history: the invading conquerors don't treat a country according to the laws they find there, but according to their own laws. However, it is unmistakably the case that the result of dream-work represents a compromise. In the distortion imposed on the unconscious material and in the attempts – often inadequate – to give the whole thing a form that is still acceptable to the *Ich* (secondary processing), we can see the influence of the *Ich*-organization that is not yet paralysed. That is, to use our analogy, an expression of the continued resistance of the vanquished.

The laws governing the course of events in the unconscious that come to light in such a way are peculiar enough, and give us an adequate explanation for most of what we find strange about dreams. Above all, there is a striking tendency to *compression*, an inclination to create new unities out of elements that we would certainly have kept separate in waking thought. As a consequence of this, a single element of the manifest dream often represents a whole host of latent dream thoughts, as if it were an allusion common to all of them, and the scope of the manifest dream is as a whole extraordinarily condensed compared to the rich material that it came from. Another peculiarity of dream-work, not entirely independent of the earlier one, is the ease with which psychical intensities (investments) are displaced from one element to another, so that in the manifest dream one element that was unimportant in the dream thoughts often appears to be the clearest and, correspondingly, the most important; and, vice versa, essential elements of the

dream thoughts are represented in the manifest dream merely by slight allusions. Moreover, having quite insignificant points in common is mostly sufficient for the dream-work to be able to replace one element with another in all further operations. It is easy to grasp the extent to which these mechanisms of compression and displacement can make it difficult for us to interpret a dream and to uncover the relationships between the manifest dream and the latent dream thoughts. From the proof that these two tendencies to compress and displace one another do exist, our theory draws the conclusion that energy exists in a state of free movement in the unconscious *Es* and that it matters more than anything else to the *Es* to find a release for quantities of excitation;[8] and it [our theory] uses both of these two peculiarities to characterize the primary processes attributed to the *Es*.

By studying dream-work, we have come to know yet many more characteristics of the processes in the unconscious; characteristics that are as remarkable as they are important. Only a few of these will be mentioned here. The decisive rules of logic don't apply in the unconscious; we could call it the Empire of the Illogical. Urges with opposing aims exist alongside one another in the unconscious, without the need ever arising for them to adjust to one another. They either have no influence whatsoever on one another or, if they have, then what arises is not a decision in favour of one or the other, but a compromise that becomes nonsensical because it includes details that are mutually incompatible. Closely related to this is the fact that oppositions are not kept apart in the unconscious but are treated as if they were identical, so that every element in a manifest dream can also signify its opposite. A few linguistic researchers have recognized that it was just the same in the most ancient languages and that oppositions like 'strong–weak', 'light–dark', or 'high–deep' were originally expressed through the same root until two different modifications of the original word separated the two meanings from one another. Remnants of the original dual meaning are still supposed to be preserved even in a language so highly developed as Latin, in the use of words like *altus* ('high' and 'deep') and *sacer* ('sacred' and 'infamous') among others.

In view of the complications and the ambiguity of the relationships between the manifest dream and the latent content that lies behind it, it is of course justifiable to ask how we can arrive at the very idea of deriving the one from the other and whether we are not solely thrown back on making a lucky guess, supported perhaps by a translation of the symbols appearing in the manifest dream. We may respond by saying that this task can be satisfactorily solved in practically all cases, but only with the help of the associations that the dreamer himself brings to the elements of the manifest content. Every other way of proceeding is arbitrary and provides no surety. However, the dreamer's associations reveal the intermediate links; we can slot these into the gaps between the two [that is, the manifest and the latent] and, with their help, we can reinstate the latent content of the dream, 'interpret' the dream. It is hardly surprising if every now and again this interpretative work, acting in opposition to the dream-work, fails to deliver a secure answer.

It still remains for us to offer a dynamic explanation for why the sleeping *Ich* takes on the task of dream-work at all. Luckily, this explanation is easy to find. With the help of the unconscious, every dream that is in the process of being formed makes a demand on the *Ich* to have a drive gratified (if it comes from the *Es*); or to resolve a conflict, remove a doubt, form an intention (if it comes from a residue of preconscious activity in waking life). However, the sleeping *Ich* is focused on the wish to carry on sleeping; it perceives this demand as a disturbance and thus seeks to get rid of it. The *Ich* succeeds in doing so through an act of apparent indulgence: it meets the demand with a *wish-fulfilment* which is harmless in these circumstances and thus removes it. This replacement of the demand by a wish-fulfilment remains the dream-work's most essential function. It is perhaps not superfluous to elaborate on this with three simple examples: a hunger dream, a comfort dream, and a dream provoked by sexual desire. While he is asleep the dreamer feels a need for food; he dreams of a magnificent meal and carries on sleeping. He had, of course, the choice either to wake up and eat, or to continue sleeping. He decided on the latter

and satisfied his hunger through his dream. For a while, at any rate; if his hunger persisted, he would have to wake up after all. Here is the second example: the sleeper, a doctor, is supposed to wake up in order to be at the hospital at a certain time. However, he carries on sleeping and dreams that he is already at the hospital – but as a patient who doesn't need to leave his bed. Or, to take a third example, the dreamer feels a yearning during the night to enjoy a forbidden sexual object, namely a friend's wife. He dreams of sexual intercourse with, it is true, an indifferent person – but one who nevertheless shares his friend's wife's name. Alternatively, his attempt to resist his desire expresses itself by his dream-lover remaining totally anonymous.

Of course, not all cases are so easy. Particularly with dreams that come from the day's undealt-with residua and that have simply undergone an unconscious reinforcement in the sleeping state it is often difficult to uncover the unconscious drive-force and to establish its wish-fulfilment, but we can assume that it is always present. The theory that dreams represent a wish-fulfilment will easily provoke disbelief if one remembers how many dreams have a directly unpleasant content or even cause us to wake up through fear, quite apart from the frequent dreams that have no particular emotional tone. But the objection about fear-dreams doesn't stand up to analysis. One mustn't forget that dreams are always the result of a conflict; they are a type of compromise-formation. Anything that is gratifying to the unconscious *Es* can be a cause for the *Ich* to feel fear – precisely because it *is* gratifying.

As the dream-work proceeds, the unconscious sometimes asserts itself better; at other times, the *Ich* defends itself more energetically. Fear-dreams are mostly the ones in which the content has been least distorted. If the demand of the unconscious becomes so great that the sleeping *Ich* is not in a position to fend it off by the means at its disposal, then it abandons its desire to sleep and returns to waking life. We will be taking all our experiences into account if we say that every dream is an *attempt* to eliminate disturbances to sleep by wish-fulfilment; thus dreams are the guardians of sleep. This attempt can be more or less completely successful;

it can also fail – and then the sleeper awakes, apparently roused from his slumber by precisely this dream. Likewise, the good night-watchman who is supposed to guard the sleep of the little town sometimes has no alternative but to make a commotion and awaken the sleeping townspeople.

To conclude these discussions I shall add a remark that will justify the large amount of time we have spent on the problem of dream interpretation. It has turned out to be the case that the unconscious mechanisms that we have come to know through studying dream-work and that explain dream-formation to us also help us to understand the formation of the puzzling symptoms that make neurosis and psychosis so interesting to us. A correspondence of this kind must invariably awaken great hopes in us.

Part Two: The Practical Task

Chapter 6: the Psychoanalytical Technique

Dreams, then, are a psychosis, with all the inconsistencies, delusions, and tricks of the senses that the psychoses demonstrate. Admittedly, they are a short-lived psychosis; a harmless one; one even entrusted with a useful function, introduced with the individual's consent, ended by an act of his will. But, all the same, they are a psychosis; and we learn from them that even such a profound change in the psyche can be reversed and the normal function can take its place. Is it, then, too bold to hope that it must be possible to make the dreaded spontaneous psychical illnesses submit to our influence as well – and that they must be curable?

We already know a number of things that prepare us to undertake this task. According to our premiss, the *Ich* has the job of satisfying the claims of its three dependencies – reality, the *Es*, and the *Über-Ich* – while still retaining its organization and asserting its independence. The condition that brings about the state of illness

that we are talking about can only be a relative or total weakening of the *Ich* that makes it impossible for it to fulfil its tasks. The most difficult demand on the *Ich* is probably that of suppressing the drive-claims from the *Es*; for this, it has to maintain large amounts of energy in opposing investments. However, the demands of the *Über-Ich* can also become so powerful and relentless that the *Ich* faces its other tasks as if it were paralysed. We suspect that in the economic conflict that arises here, the *Es* and *Über-Ich* often make common cause against the besieged *Ich*, which wants to cling onto reality in order to retain its normality. If the first two become too powerful, they succeed in breaking up and changing the organization of the *Ich* so that its proper relationship to reality is disturbed or even cancelled out. We saw this in the case of dreams; if the *Ich* becomes detached from the reality of the external world then it sinks, under the influence of the internal world, into psychosis.

We base our plan for a cure on these insights. The *Ich* is weakened by the internal conflict; we have to come to its aid. It is like being in a civil war that is to be decided by the assistance of an ally from outside. The analyst and the patient's weakened *Ich* are, basing themselves on the objective external world, supposed to form a team against the enemies, namely the drive-demands of the *Es* and the conscience-demands of the *Über-Ich*. We make a deal with each other. The ailing *Ich* promises to be fully honest with us, that is, to put at our disposal all the material that its self-perception offers it; in return, we promise it the utmost discretion, and we put at its service our experience in interpreting material influenced by the unconscious. Our knowledge is supposed to compensate for its *lack* of knowledge; it is supposed to return to the *Ich* its dominance over lost zones of the psyche. This deal constitutes the analytical situation.

No sooner have we taken this step than the first disappointment awaits us, the first reminder that we should be more modest. If the patient's *Ich* is to be a valuable ally in our mutual labours, it must have preserved a certain measure of coherence, a modicum of understanding of the demands of reality – despite all the pressure put on it by hostile forces. But this can't be expected of the

psychotic's *Ich*; this can't stick to a deal of this kind; indeed it can barely enter into such a deal at all. It will very soon have rejected us and the help that we are offering as belonging to the parts of the external world that no longer signify anything to it. We thus recognize that we have to abandon the idea of trying out our attempts at a cure on psychotics. Perhaps we will have to give up forever; perhaps only temporarily, until we have found another, more suitable, plan for them.

However, there is another class of people with psychical illnesses, who are clearly closely related to the psychotics: the vast number of people suffering from severe neurosis. The conditions that bring about their illness as well as its pathogenic mechanisms have to be the same – or at least very similar – in both cases. But the *Ich* of neurotics has proved itself to be more capable of resistance, has become less disorganized. Many neurotics have been able to hold their own in real life, despite all their complaints and the shortcomings that these cause. These neurotics may show themselves prepared to accept our help. We want to restrict our interest to them, and to attempt to see how far and by which methods we can 'cure' them.

With the neurotics, then, we make this deal: total honesty in return for complete discretion. That gives the impression that we were simply aiming to take the place of a secular father confessor. But there is a great difference. For we don't simply want to hear from the patient the things he knows and hides from others: he also has to tell us what he *doesn't* know. With this in mind, we give him a more precise definition of what we mean by honesty. We commit him to the *fundamental rule* of analysis, which is henceforth to govern his behaviour towards us. He is not simply to tell us what he intends to say, what he is happy to say, the things that would give him the kind of relief he would get after a confession: he has to tell us everything that his self-observation yields to him; everything that comes into his mind, even if it is unpleasant for him to say it, even if it seems to him to be unimportant or even ridiculous. If he succeeds in switching off his self-critical mechanism after being instructed thus, he will give us a wealth of

material – thoughts, associations, memories – that are already under the influence of the unconscious, indeed are often directly derived from it, and that thus put us in a position to deduce his repressed unconscious material and to extend the knowledge his *Ich* has of his unconscious by sharing this with him.

However, this by no means suggests that the role of the *Ich* would be restricted to one of passive obedience, whereby it would deliver us the material we demand, and would trustingly accept our translation of this. A number of other things happen, a few of which we might have foreseen and others which are bound to surprise us. The most remarkable thing is that the patient doesn't continue to see the analyst in a realistic light, as a helper and advisor who, moreover, is paid for his efforts and who would himself be quite happy to play the role of, say, a mountain-guide on a difficult mountain climb. Rather, he sees in the analyst the return – the reincarnation – of an important person from his childhood, his past; and, because of this, transfers feelings and reactions onto him that undoubtedly applied to this role model. This fact of transference soon proves to be a factor of undreamt-of significance: on the one hand, it is an aid of irreplaceable value; on the other hand, it is a source of serious dangers. This transference is *ambivalent*: it encompasses positive and tender attitudes as well as negative, hostile ones towards the analyst, who is as a rule put in the place of one or other of the patient's parents, his father or his mother. So long as it is positive, it serves us admirably. It changes the whole analytical situation; it forces aside the patient's rational intention of becoming healthy and free from suffering. In its place appears the intention of pleasing the analyst, of gaining his approval and love. This becomes the actual motivating force of the patient's cooperation; the weak *Ich* becomes strong and, under its influence, the patient achieves things that he would normally find impossible; the symptoms cease and he appears to become healthy – but only for the sake of the analyst. The analyst may admit rather shamefacedly that he had embarked upon a difficult task without having the faintest idea as to the extraordinary powers that would put themselves at his disposal.

Moreover, the transference relationship brings two further advantages with it. If the patient puts the analyst in the place of his father (or his mother), then he also grants him the power that his *Über-Ich* exercises over his *Ich*, as these parents were, of course, the origins of the *Über-Ich*. The new *Über-Ich* now has the opportunity to, so to speak, re-educate the neurotic: it can correct mistakes for which his parents were responsible in his upbringing. Admittedly, we must at this point insert a warning against misusing our new influence. However much the analyst may be tempted to become teacher, role model and ideal for others, to create humans in his own image, he mustn't forget that this is not his task in the analytical relationship; indeed, that he would be betraying his task if he allowed himself to be swept away by his inclinations. He would then simply be repeating one of the mistakes of the parents, who crushed their child's independence by their influence. He would be merely replacing the earlier dependence by a newer one. In all his efforts to improve and educate the patient, though, the analyst should respect his individuality. The degree of influence that he can legitimately allow himself will be determined by the degree of developmental inhibition that the patient exhibits. Some neurotics have remained so infantile that in analysis, too, they can only be treated like children.

Yet another advantage of transference is that it allows the patient to present us with an important part of his life story in all its plastic clarity – a part about which he would probably otherwise have given us insufficient information. He as it were acts it out for us instead of telling us about it.

Now let us turn to the other side of the relationship. As transference reproduces the patient's relationship to his parents, it also takes over the ambivalence of this relationship. It is almost impossible to avoid the positive attitude towards the analyst ultimately changing into the negative, hostile one. This, too, is usually a repetition of the past. The patient's tractability vis-à-vis his father (if the father was the person in question) and his courting of his father's favour were rooted in an erotic desire directed towards the latter individual. At some time or another, this demand presses its

way forward in transference as well, and will insist on being gratified. In the analytical situation, it can only meet with a refusal. Actual sexual relations between patient and analyst are ruled out; even the more subtle means of gratification such as showing preference to someone or being intimate with them are granted only very sparingly by the analyst. A spurning of this kind is taken by the patient as a reason to change his attitude; the same probably happened during his childhood.

It is suspected that the successful cures that were brought about while the positive transference was dominant might be of a *suggestive* nature. If negative transference gains the upper hand they are blown away like chaff in the wind. We are horrified to see that all our efforts, all our work, have been in vain thus far. Indeed, even that which we might take to be a permanent intellectual gain on the patient's part – his understanding of psychoanalysis and his faith in its effectiveness – suddenly disappears. He behaves like a child who has no faculty to judge for himself, who blindly believes whoever he loves – and no outsider. The danger of these transference states obviously consists in the patient misunderstanding their nature and taking them to be new, real experiences, rather than reflections of the past. If he (or she) feels the strong erotic desire hidden behind positive transference, then he believes that he has fallen passionately in love; if the transference then veers in the opposite direction, he considers himself to be insulted and neglected; he hates the analyst, his enemy, and is quite prepared to give up analysis. In both extreme cases, he has forgotten the deal he made at the start of the treatment and has become no use for further work together. The analyst's task is always to tear the patient away from the threatening illusion; to show him again and again that what he takes to be a new, real life is actually a reflection of the past. And, in order that the patient doesn't get into a state that makes him inaccessible to all evidence, we have to take care that neither his love nor his hostility reaches an extreme level. We do this by being prepared early on for these possibilities, and by paying due regard to their early signs. Such care when managing transference tends to be very worthwhile. If we succeed, as we

mostly do, in enlightening the patient about the true nature of the phenomena of transference, then we shall have deprived his resistance of a powerful weapon and shall have converted dangers into gains, for the patient will never forget what he has experienced in the forms of transference; it has more power to convince him than anything he has acquired in any other way.

We find it most undesirable if the patient *acts out* his experiences outside transference rather than remembering them. For our purposes, the ideal conduct would be for him to behave as normally as possible outside treatment and to express his abnormal reactions only in transference.

Our method of strengthening the weakened *Ich* takes an increase in its self-knowledge as its starting point. We know that there is more to it than this – but it is a first step. The loss of such knowledge means that the *Ich* forfeits power and influence; it is the first tangible sign that it is being hemmed in and hampered by the demands of the *Es* and the *Über-Ich*. Thus the first part of the assistance we offer is an intellectual exertion on our part and a summons to the patient to collaborate in it. We know that this initial activity is supposed to prepare the way for us to undertake another, more difficult task. We shall not lose sight of the dynamic elements of this task even during its introductory phase. We acquire the material for our work from various sources: from whatever the patient's communications and free associations allude to; from what he demonstrates in his transferences; from whatever we draw from the interpretation of his dreams; from whatever is betrayed by his 'slips'. All this material helps us to make suppositions about what has happened to him and what he has forgotten, as well as about what is currently happening inside him without his understanding it. However, we never forget in the process to keep a strict distinction between our knowledge and his knowledge. We avoid plunging in and telling him things that we have deduced often very early on in the piece, and we avoid telling him *everything* that we believe we have deduced. We consider very carefully at what point we should make him privy to one of our suppositions; we wait for a moment that seems the most suitable – something that is not always

easy to decide. Normally we postpone sharing a supposition with him, enlightening him, until he has himself come so close to it that all that remains is for him to take one more step – albeit the step representing the decisive synthesis. If we proceeded differently, if we were to bombard him with our interpretations before he was prepared for them, then what we said would either have no effect or it would provoke a violent attack of *resistance* that would make it difficult to continue with our work, or could even jeopardize it altogether. If, however, we have prepared the ground correctly then we often achieve a situation in which the patient immediately confirms our interpretation and himself remembers the forgotten internal or external processes. The more precisely our interpretation coincides with the details of what the patient has forgotten, the easier it is for him to agree with it. Our knowledge on that particular matter has in this case become his knowledge, too.

Mentioning resistance brings us to the second, more important part of our task. We have already heard that the *Ich* protects itself against being invaded by undesired elements from the unconscious and repressed *Es* by means of opposing investments that must remain intact if it is to function normally. The more oppressed the *Ich* now feels, the more desperately it persists – terrified, as it were – with these opposing investments, in order to protect what remains of it against further encroachment. This defensive tendency, however, doesn't in the slightest accord with the intentions of our treatment. On the contrary, what we want is for the *Ich*, emboldened by the security that our help affords it, to venture an attack in order to recapture what it has lost. In the process we come to sense the force of this opposing investment as *resistance* to our work. The *Ich* recoils from apparently dangerous undertakings of this kind that threaten unpleasure. It has constantly to be spurred on and pacified in order for it not to refuse to cooperate with us. This resistance, which persists throughout the entire course of treatment and which renews itself with every new piece of work, is what we somewhat incorrectly call *repression-resistance*. We shall hear that this resistance is not the only one we have to face. It is interesting to see that in this situation the party divisions are to a

certain extent reversed: the *Ich* resists our suggestions, but the unconscious, normally our opponent, comes to our aid, for it has a natural 'impetus' and desires nothing more than to advance beyond the barriers the *Ich* sets up against it and into consciousness. The battle that develops if we achieve what we intend to achieve – namely to incite the *Ich* to overcome its resistances – is carried out under our direction and with our assistance. It doesn't matter what its outcome is, whether it leads to the *Ich* adopting a rejected drive-demand after submitting to fresh examination, or if it dismisses it again, this time for good. In both cases, a constant danger has been eliminated, the scope of the *Ich* has been broadened, and a wasteful expenditure of energy has been made unnecessary.

Overcoming resistances is the part of our work that takes up the most time and the greatest trouble. However, it is also worth it, for it brings about an advantageous transformation in the *Ich*; a transformation that will be maintained and will stand the test of life quite regardless of the outcome of transference. At the same time, we have also worked to remove the change within the *Ich* that had come about under the influence of the unconscious, for whenever we were able to demonstrate the existence of such progeny within the *Ich*, we pointed out their illegitimate origins and incited the *Ich* to reject them. We will recall that one of the conditions we attached to our assistance when we did our deal was that a change of this type within the *Ich* caused by an unconscious element storming it was not to exceed a certain measure.

The further our work progresses, and the more deeply we come to understand the psyche of neurotics, the more clearly are we pressed to recognize two new factors that demand the closest attention as sources of resistance. Both are completely unknown to the patient, and neither could be taken into account when we made our deal; moreover, they don't come from the patient's *Ich*. Whilst we can draw them together under the single phrase 'the need to be ill or to suffer', their origins differ, although there is an affinity between them as regards their nature. The first of these two factors is the feeling of guilt, or consciousness of guilt, as it is called, disregarding the fact that the patient neither feels nor recognizes it. It

is evidently the contribution to resistance made by an *Über-Ich* that has become particularly harsh and cruel. The individual shall not become healthy: he shall remain ill, for he deserves nothing better. This resistance doesn't actually disrupt our intellectual work but it does render it ineffectual; indeed, it often allows us to dispose of one form of neurotic suffering, but is immediately ready to replace it by another illness – a somatic one, if it comes to it. This consciousness of guilt also explains the phenomenon that we see every now and again whereby severe neurosis is cured or improved by real misfortunes; for the only thing that matters is that the individual is wretched, irrespective of how. The uncomplaining resignation with which such people often bear their hard fate is most remarkable, but is also revealing. In defending ourselves against this resistance, we have to restrict ourselves to making it conscious and to the attempt to slowly dismantle the hostile *Über-Ich*.

It is less easy to prove the existence of another form of resistance, a form that we find ourselves particularly ill-equipped to fight against. Among the neurotics, there are people in whom, to judge from all their reactions, the self-preservation drive has undergone a reversal. They seem to be set on nothing other than self-harm and self-destruction. The individuals who really do ultimately commit suicide perhaps belong to this group of people, too. We suppose that in their case, extensive drive de-mergences have taken place, which have resulted in the liberation of excessive quantities of the destruction-drive that are turned inwards. Such patients can't endure being restored to health by our treatment, and resist it with every means at their disposal. But we do have to admit that this is a case that we have not entirely succeeded in explaining yet.

Let us now survey the situation that we have put ourselves into by trying to help the neurotic *Ich*. This *Ich* can no longer fulfil the tasks set for it by the external world, including human society. It doesn't have all its experiences at its disposal; a large portion of its memory bank has gone astray. Its activity is arrested by the strict prohibitions of the *Über-Ich*; its energy is eaten up by vain attempts to defend itself against the demands of the *Es*. Moreover, as a result of the continuing incursions of the *Es*, its organization is damaged;

it is split; it can no longer create any kind of orderly synthesis; it is torn apart by mutually opposing urges, unresolved conflicts, and unrelieved doubts. The first thing we do is allow the patient's weakened *Ich* to take part in the purely intellectual work of interpretation, which strives provisionally to fill the gaps in his psyche; we have the authority of his *Über-Ich* transferred onto us – and then we incite it to take up the cudgels over every single demand made by the *Es* and to conquer the resistances that arise in the process. At the same time, we reinstate the order in his *Ich* by tracking down the material and urges that have penetrated it from the unconscious and by exposing them to criticism by tracing them back to their origins. We serve the patient in various functions: as authority and parent substitute; as teacher and educator; we will have served him best if we manage in our capacity as analysts to raise the psychical processes in his *Ich* onto a normal level, transform material that has become unconscious, repressed, into *preconscious* material and thus give it back to the *Ich*. So far as the patient is concerned, we find a few of his rational factors work in our favour, such as his need (motivated by his suffering) to get better and the intellectual interest that we can awaken in him for what psychoanalysis can teach and reveal to us all. Of far greater force, however, is the positive transference with which he meets us. Fighting against us, on the other hand, are the negative transference, the repression-resistance of the *Ich* (its unpleasure at having to expose itself to the hard work imposed on it), the feelings of guilt provoked by its relationship with the *Über-Ich*, and the need to be ill, resulting from far-reaching changes to its drive-economy. Whether we can describe the patient's particular case as a mild or severe one depends on the degree to which the two latter factors are involved. Apart from these, we can recognize a few other factors that can be considered to have a favourable or unfavourable effect. A certain psychical lethargy or a sluggishness of the libido that doesn't want to abandon its fixations can't be welcome to us; the person's capacity to sublimate his drives plays a large role, as does his capacity to raise himself above the crude life of the drives and the relative power of his intellectual functions.

Rather than being disappointed by this, we find it entirely understandable if we come to the conclusion that the final outcome of the battle that we have entered into depends on quantitative relations – on the amount of energy that we can mobilize in the patient to our advantage, as compared to the sum of energy of the forces operating against us. Here, again, God is with the stronger battalions. It is true that we don't always emerge victorious, but we can at least mostly see why the victory was not ours. Anyone who has followed our explanations only out of therapeutic interest will probably turn away contemptuously after this admission. But here we are concerned with the therapy only in so far as it works with psychological means; at the moment we have no others. The future may tell us how we can use particular chemicals to directly influence the amounts of energy and their distribution in the psychical apparatus. Perhaps other therapeutic possibilities, as yet unimagined, will also present themselves. But for the time being we have nothing better at our disposal than the psychoanalytical technique – and for that reason, despite its limitations, we ought not to despise it.

Chapter 7: a Sample of Psychoanalytical Work

We have obtained for ourselves a generalized knowledge of the psychical apparatus, of the parts, organs and authorities that it consists of, of the forces that operate within it, and of the functions entrusted to its parts. Neurosis and psychosis are the states that express disturbances to the function of the apparatus. We have chosen the neuroses as an object for study, for they alone seem to be accessible to the psychological methods of our interference. While we are making an effort to influence them, we gather the observations that will give us a picture of where and how they arise.

We want to mention one of our main findings in advance of our portrayal. Unlike infectious diseases, for example, the neuroses are not caused by some specific thing. It would be quite pointless to go looking for pathogens in their case. For one thing, they merge

imperceptibly with the so-called norm; and, on the other hand, there is barely a single supposedly 'normal' state in which we could not point out indications of neurotic traits. Neurotics are equipped with pretty much the same innate constitution as everyone else; they experience the same things; they have no different tasks to perform. So why are their lives so much worse, so much more difficult? Why do they suffer more unpleasurable feelings, more fear and pain in the process?

We need not leave this question unanswered. What are responsible for the shortcomings and sufferings of neurotics are quantitative *disharmonies*. Indeed, the causation of *all* the forms of the human psyche is to be sought in the reciprocal action between innate dispositions and adventitious experiences. At one point, the disposition of a particular drive may be too strong or weak; a particular capacity may be stunted or may not have developed sufficiently during the individual's life. On the other hand, external impressions and experiences can make demands of varying strength on different individuals, and what one person's constitution can deal with may present an impossible task for another's. These quantitative differences will determine the variety of possible outcomes.

However, we shall very soon realize that this is not a satisfactory explanation. It is too general; it explains too much. Our specified aetiology does apply to all cases of psychical suffering, misery and paralysis – but not all these states can be called neurotic. The neuroses have specific characteristics; they are a special type of misery. Thus we must expect that we will after all be able to find specific causes for them; or we can come up with the notion that, of all the tasks that the psyche has to deal with, there are some that defeat it particularly easily – which means that we could say, without having to retract our previous remarks, that the peculiarity of neurotic phenomena, often so remarkable, would be derived from this. If it remains the case that the neuroses are essentially no different from the norm, then the study of them promises to deliver us valuable contributions to our knowledge of this norm. In the process, we shall perhaps discover the 'weak spots' of a normal organization.

The above supposition is confirmed. Analytical experiences teach us that there really is one drive-demand that tends to be dealt with either unsuccessfully or with only partial success; and that there is a particular period of life that exclusively or predominantly merits consideration so far as the formation of neurosis is concerned. Both the nature of the drive and the period of life are factors that demand to be considered separately, although they have much to do with one another.

We can comment with some degree of certainty on the role played by the period of life. It appears that neuroses are acquired only in early childhood (up until the age of six), although the symptoms may not appear until much later. Childhood neurosis may manifest itself for a short time, or may even be overlooked. In all cases, later neurotic illness links up with this prelude in childhood. So-called traumatic neurosis (caused by extreme terror or severe somatic shocks such as railway collisions, being buried alive, and such like) is perhaps an exception to this; its relationship to the determining factors of infancy has thus far eluded investigation. It is easy to account for the aetiological preference for the first period of childhood. The neuroses, as we know, are disorders of the *Ich*, and it is hardly surprising that the *Ich*, so long as it is weak, unformed, and incapable of resistance, fails to master tasks that it could deal with later on with its eyes shut, so to speak. (In these cases, the drive-demands from within, like the excitations from the external world, act as 'traumas' – especially if they encounter certain tendencies.) The helpless *Ich* defends itself against them by making attempts to flee (repressions), which later turn out to be inexpedient and mean permanent restrictions on its further development. The damage done to the *Ich* by its first experiences seems to us to be disproportionately large, but if we want an analogy, we need only think of the differences between the effect of a needle being stuck into a mass of cells that are in the process of cell-division (as in the experiments of Roux) and that of it being stuck into the finished animal that the cells have later turned into. No human individual is spared traumatic experiences of this kind; none is absolved from the repressions that they give rise to. These dubious

reactions of the *Ich* are perhaps indispensable for it to achieve another goal that it sets for itself for the same period of life. Within the space of only a few years, the little primitive is supposed to have turned into a civilized human child; is supposed to have completed an immensely long stretch of human civilized development in an almost uncannily abbreviated form. This is made possible by whatever predispositions it inherits but it can, moreover, almost never do without the assistance of its upbringing, of the parents' influence that is a precursor of the *Über-Ich* in that it circumscribes the activity of the *Ich* through rules and punishments, and encourages or enforces repressions to be carried out. Nor ought we to forget, therefore, the influence of civilization when it comes to the factors conditioning neurosis. We recognize that it is easy for the barbarian to be healthy, whereas it is a difficult task for the civilized human. We may find the yearning for a strong, uninhibited *Ich* perfectly comprehensible; but, as our current age shows us, it is in the most profound sense inimical to civilization. And, since the demands of civilization are represented by the upbringing in the family, we must also bear in mind this biological characteristic of the human species, the extended period of childhood dependency, when we are considering the aetiology of neurosis.

So far as the other point, the specific drive-factor, is concerned, we discover an interesting dissonance between theory and practice. Theoretically speaking, there is no reason not to suppose that any old drive-demand could give rise to the same repressions with all their consequences; but our observations frequently show us, so far as we can judge, that the excitations that play this pathogenic role arise from the partial drives of sexual life. The symptoms of neurosis are always, so one might argue, either substitute gratifications for some sexual urge or another, or measures to prevent them being gratified; they are as a rule compromises between the two, of the kind that come about according to the laws of oppositions that apply to the unconscious. At this moment in time the gap in our theory can't be filled; the decision is made all the more difficult by the fact that most sexual urges are not purely erotic in

nature, but are the product of erotic drives and elements of the destruction-drive being combined with one another. However, there can be no doubt that the drives that manifest themselves in a physiological sense as sexuality play a prominent, unexpectedly large role in the causation of neurosis – though it remains to be seen whether it is an exclusive one. We also have to bear in mind that no other function has been so energetically and comprehensively rejected over the course of cultural development as precisely the sexual one. Our theory will have to make do with a few hints that point to a more profound connection: the fact that the first period of childhood, when the *Ich* begins to differentiate itself from the *Es*, is also the period of early sexual blossoming, which the latency period puts an end to; that it can hardly happen by chance that this momentous 'prehistory' is later subject to infantile amnesia; and, finally, that biological changes in the sexual life – such as precisely this two-phased onset of the function, the loss of the periodicity of sexual arousal and the transformation in the relationship between female menstruation and male excitation – must have been highly significant for man's evolution from animals. It remains for the science of the future to put these isolated pieces of data together to come to a new view. It is not psychology but biology that shows a gap here. It would perhaps not be unjustified to say that the weak spot in the organization of the *Ich* lay in the way it related to the sexual function, as if the biological opposition between self-preservation and species-preservation had here managed to create for itself a form of psychological expression. If analytical experience has convinced us that the assertion we hear so often – that the child is, psychologically speaking, the father of the man, and that the experiences of his early years are of unsurpassable significance for his entire later life – is totally correct, then it will be of particular interest to us if there is one special thing that we can take to be the central experience of this period of childhood. Our attention is firstly attracted by the effects of certain influences that don't apply to all children, although they appear often enough – such as the sexual abuse of children by adults; their being seduced by other, slightly older, children (brothers or sisters);

and, unexpectedly enough, their being deeply affected by taking part (as visual or aural witnesses) in adults' (their parents') sexual deeds, mostly at a time when we would not believe them either to be interested in or to understand such processes, nor to be able to remember them later on. It is easy to establish the extent to which the child's sexual receptiveness is awakened by such experiences and the extent to which his own sexual urges are forced down certain paths that he can never leave again. Since these impressions are subjected to repression either immediately or as soon as they try to return as memories, they set up the conditions for the neurotic obsessions that will later make it impossible for the *Ich* to master the sexual function and will probably make it turn away from it permanently. The latter reaction will result in a neurosis; if it fails to appear, then manifold perversions develop – or the function, so immeasurably important both for reproduction and for the entire shaping of life, will become totally insubordinate.

Instructive though such cases may be, the influence of another situation commands an even greater degree of interest. This is a situation that all children are destined to experience and that is necessarily derived from the factor of the extended period during which the child is looked after and during which it lives together with its parents. By this, I mean the *Oedipus complex*, so called because its essential content recurs in the Greek legend of King Oedipus, which has, luckily, been preserved for us by a great dramatist. The Greek hero kills his father and takes his mother as his wife. The fact that he does this unawares – by not recognizing them as his parents – is a divergence from the analytical facts of the matter, which we can easily understand and which, indeed, we can even recognize as inevitable.

Here, we have to depict the development of boys and girls – males and females – separately, for it is now that the difference between the sexes expresses itself psychologically for the first time. The biological fact of the duality of the sexes presents itself to us as a great enigma; this represents one of the ultimate facts of our knowledge, defying all attempts to trace it back to anything else. Psychoanalysis has contributed nothing to explaining this problem;

it clearly belongs entirely to biology. In the psyche we find only reflections of that great opposition, which are made difficult to interpret by a fact we have long suspected, namely that no individual being is restricted to one sex's ways of reacting but always allows a certain amount of room for those of the opposite sex too – in just the same way that the body bears the atrophied and often useless rudiments of the opposite sex's organs alongside the developed organs of its own. An empirical and conventional equation that is quite clearly inadequate serves to distinguish the male from the female in the psyche. We call everything that is strong and active 'male' and everything that is weak and passive 'female'. This fact that there is also *psychological* bisexuality weighs upon all our investigations, making it difficult for us to describe them.

The child's first erotic object is the maternal breast that feeds it; love arises on the pattern of the gratified need for nourishment. At first, the child certainly doesn't distinguish between the breast and its own body; when the breast then has to be separated from the child's own body, transferred 'outwards' because he so often finds it absent, it takes part of the originally narcissistic libido-investment with it as an 'object'. Later on, the whole person of the mother comes to constitute this initial object; she not only nourishes the child but also cares for it and thus awakens a number of other physical sensations within it – both pleasurable and unpleasurable. In taking care of the child's bodily needs, she becomes its first seductress. The significance of the mother – unique, incomparable, unalterable throughout the whole of the individual's life – is rooted in these two relations; she is the first and strongest love-object, the paradigm for all later love-relationships – for both sexes. In all this, phylogeny has the upper hand over the individual's personal, accidental experiences to such an extent that it makes no difference whether the child really did suck at the breast or whether it was in fact bottle-fed and thus never enjoyed the tenderness of maternal care. In both cases, the individual's development takes the same course; indeed, in the latter case, the later yearning may become all the more intense. And, regardless of how long the child was nourished by its mother's breast, it will always remain convinced

once it has been weaned that it was not long enough, and that she did not give it enough food.

This introduction is not superfluous; it can enhance our understanding of the intensity of the Oedipus complex. Once the boy has entered the phallic phase of his libido development (from two to three years old), has obtained pleasurable sensations from his sexual organ, and has learned how to create these for himself whenever he feels like it through manual stimulation, he becomes the mother's lover. He desires to possess her physically in the ways he has divined from his observations and notions of sexual life; he tries to seduce her by showing her his male member, his pride and joy. In short, his early awakened maleness tries to replace his father in her affections – the father who has already been his envied role model up to this point due to the physical strength which he perceives in him and due to the authority in which he sees him clothed. Now the father is the rival who stands in his way, and whom he wishes to get rid of. If his father happened to be away and he was allowed to share his mother's bed, only to find himself banished from it again on his father's return, then it comes to make a profound impression on him that his father's disappearance means gratification, and his re-emergence means disappointment. This is the content of the Oedipus complex, which the Greek legend has translated from the child's fantasy world into supposed reality. In our particular cultural circumstances, a terrible end normally awaits it.

The mother understands perfectly well that the boy's sexual arousal relates to her own person. At some point, she reflects that it is wrong to allow it to continue, and she believes she is doing the right thing if she forbids him to manipulate his member. This ban, though, is of little use; at the most, it brings about a modification in the *method* of self-gratification. Eventually, the mother resorts to the severest measure: she threatens to take the thing away from him which he is using to defy her. She usually attributes the responsibility for carrying out this threat to the father, in order to make it more terrifying and believable. She, so she says, will tell Father, and he will chop the organ off. Strangely enough,

this threat is only effective if another condition is fulfilled both beforehand and afterwards.[9] In itself, it seems all too unimaginable to the boy that such a thing could happen. But if, when he is threatened, he can recall what female genitals look like, or if he encounters such genitals shortly afterwards – where this part of the body, prized above all else, really is absent – then he believes in the gravity of what he has heard and, becoming enmired in the *castration complex*, experiences the most severe trauma of his young life.[10]

The effects of the castration threat are manifold and quite enormous; they affect all the boy's dealings with his parents and, later, with men and women as a whole. Mostly, the child's maleness can't stand up to this initial shock. In order to rescue his sexual organ, he more or less entirely renounces all ownership of the mother; his sexual life frequently remains burdened by this ban for ever more. If a strong female component – as we put it – is present in him, then it gains strength from his maleness being intimidated. He gets into a passive attitude vis-à-vis his father such as he ascribes to his mother. As a result of the threat he has indeed given up masturbating – but he has not abandoned the flights of fantasy that accompany it. On the contrary, as they are now the sole form of sexual gratification remaining for him, they are nurtured more than ever before – and in these fantasies he does indeed still identify with his father but at the same time, perhaps even predominantly, he identifies with the mother. Offshoots and modified products of these early onanistic fantasies tend to find their way into his later *Ich* and play a role in his character-formation. Fear and hatred of his father will become hugely increased, quite apart from such furtherance of his femaleness. The boy's maleness as it were withdraws and turns into a defiant attitude towards his father, one that will obsessively dictate his later conduct in the human community. As a left-over of his erotic fixation on his mother, an excessively large dependence on her sets in, which will persist in later life as servitude towards women. He no longer dares to love his mother – but nor can he risk not being loved by her, for this would put him in danger of her betraying him to his father and of being

delivered up to castration. The whole experience with all its preconditions and consequences, of which our account could give only a selection, falls victim to the most energetic repression; and, as is permitted by the laws of the unconscious *Es*, all the competing emotional impulses and reactions that were activated then remain preserved in the unconscious, ready to disrupt the later development of the *Ich* after puberty. If the somatic process of sexual maturity gives a new lease of life to libido fixations that have apparently been overcome, then sexual life will prove to be inhibited; it will lack unity, and will collapse into conflicting urges.

To be sure, the incursion of the castration threat in the boy's burgeoning sexual life doesn't always have these dreaded consequences. Again, the amount of damage done and the amount of damage avoided will depend on quantitative relations. The entire occurrence, which we may very probably regard as the central experience of childhood, the greatest problem of early life and the most powerful source of later inadequacy, is so fundamentally forgotten that when we try to reconstruct it in the analysis of adults, it meets with the most decided disbelief. Indeed, they are so averse to it that they want to silence any mention of this taboo subject and, with peculiar intellectual blindness, fail to recognize the most obvious reminders of it. Thus, for instance, one hears it said that the Oedipus legend doesn't actually have anything to do with the interpretation put upon it by psychoanalysis; that this, so it is claimed, is a quite different case since, after all, Oedipus didn't realize that it was his father he had murdered and his mother that he had married. In putting forward this kind of argument, people fail to recognize that an approach such as the psychoanalytical one is essential to an attempt to give this material poetic form, and that it doesn't introduce anything alien, but simply skilfully brings out the theme's given factors. Oedipus' ignorance is the legitimate representation of the unconsciousness into which the entire experience is sunken for adults. And the compulsion of the oracle that makes – or is supposed to make – the hero innocent is a recognition of the inevitability of the fate that has condemned all sons to live through the Oedipus complex. When on an earlier occasion it was

pointed out from psychoanalytical quarters how easily the riddle of another literary hero, Shakespeare's procrastinator Hamlet, could be solved with reference to the Oedipus complex – since of course the prince fails in his task of punishing another person for something that matches up with his own Oedipal desires – then the general lack of understanding from the literary world demonstrated the huge extent to which the mass of humans were prepared to cling to their infantile repressions.[11]

And yet, more than a century before the emergence of psychoanalysis, the Frenchman Diderot testified to the significance of the Oedipus complex, expressing the difference between the primitive age and the civilized one in this sentence: *Si le petit sauvage était abandonné à lui-même, qu'il conservât toute son imbécilité, et qu'il réunît au peu de raison de l'enfant au berceau la violence des passions de l'homme de trente ans, il tordrait le col à son père et coucherait avec sa mère.*[12] Even if psychoanalysis could boast of no other achievement than uncovering the repressed Oedipus complex, I would venture to say that this alone would give it a claim to be classified among the most valuable new acquisitions of mankind.

In the little girl's case, the effects of the castration complex are more uniform and no less profound. The female child doesn't, of course, have to fear losing her penis; however, she does have to react to not having had one in the first place. Right from the start, she envies the boy his possession; indeed, one could say that her whole development takes place under the influence of penis envy. Initially, she makes vain attempts to do the same as boys; and later on she makes more successful attempts to compensate for her defect – attempts that can ultimately lead to a normal female attitude. If during the phallic phase she tries like the boy to create pleasurable sensations in her genitals by manually stimulating them, then she often fails to obtain sufficient gratification, and the judgement she has made about the inferiority of her atrophied penis becomes extended to her whole person. As a rule, she soon abandons masturbation because she doesn't want to be reminded of the superiority of her brother or playmate, and she turns her back on sexuality altogether.

If the little woman persists in her first wish – to become a 'little boy' – she will end up being manifestly homosexual (in the most extreme cases) or will otherwise demonstrate pronounced male characteristics in later life: she will choose a 'male' career and suchlike. The alternative path runs via abandoning the beloved mother whom the daughter, influenced by penis envy, can't forgive for having sent her out into the world so ill-equipped. Full of resentment about this, she renounces the mother and substitutes another person for her as a love-object – namely the father. If someone has lost a love-object, then the obvious thing to do is to identify with it, to as it were replace it from within by identification. Here, this mechanism comes to the little girl's aid. The identification with the mother can now dissolve the initial attachment to her. The little daughter puts herself into her mother's place, as she has always done in her games; she wants to replace her in her father's affections, and, having previously loved her mother, she now has double motivation to hate her: she is jealous, as well as hurt by being denied a penis. Her new relationship with her father may initially consist of her desire to have his penis at her disposal; however, it culminates in another desire, namely for him to give her the gift of a baby. Thus the desire for a baby has taken the place of the desire for a penis – or has, at least, separated itself from it.

It is interesting to see that the relationship between the Oedipus and castration complexes takes such a different – even opposing – form in women from the one it takes in men. In the case of the latter, so we have heard, the threat of castration puts an end to the Oedipus complex; whereas in the case of the woman, we discover the opposite: she is forced into the Oedipus complex due to the effect of lacking a penis. It does little damage to the woman if she remains in her female Oedipal attitude (the name 'Electra complex' has been suggested for this). Such a woman will go on to choose her husband for his fatherly characteristics and will be prepared to recognize his authority. Her yearning for a penis, which is in fact insatiable, can only be gratified if she succeeds in rounding out her love for the organ into a love for the person who bears it – just as had happened earlier when she

progressed from loving the mother's breast to loving the mother's entire person.

If we ask an analyst about which of his patients' psychical formations have, in his experience, proved themselves least inaccessible to influence, then the answer will be thus: in the woman's case, it is the desire for a penis; in the man's case, it is his female attitude towards his own sex – which, of course, has the loss of his penis as its premiss.

Part Three: What We Gain For Our Theory

Chapter 8: The Psychical Apparatus and the External World

Even all the very general insights and premisses that we listed in our first chapter were, of course, obtained through arduous and patient detailed work, of which type the previous chapter gave us an example. We may now find it tempting to assess the ways in which our knowledge has been enriched by such work, and what sorts of paths to further progress we have opened up. In this respect we may be struck by the fact that we were so often compelled to venture beyond the boundaries of psychological science. The phenomena we were dealing with don't only belong to psychology, but also have an organic-biological dimension and, accordingly, we have also made some significant biological discoveries in our attempts to build up psychoanalysis, and we have not been able to avoid coming up with new biological hypotheses too.

However, to stay with psychology for the moment: we have recognized that it is not scientifically feasible to distinguish between what is psychically normal and psychically *abnormal*, so this distinction – despite its practical importance – has only a conventional value attached to it. We have thus established the right to understand the normal life of the psyche from its disruptions – something that would not be permitted if these states of illness, neuroses and

psychoses, had specific causes that operated along the lines of foreign bodies.

The key to understanding the psychical ailments that are permanent and life-damaging was put into our hands by studying a psychical disturbance during sleep – one that is fleeting, harmless, indeed serves a useful function. And we can now venture to assert that the psychology of consciousness was no more capable of understanding the normal functions of the psyche than it was of understanding dreams. The data of conscious self-perception, which alone were at its disposal, have proved themselves to be in every respect inadequate to grasp the wealth and complications of the psychical processes, to uncover the connections between them and thus to recognize the conditions under which they are disrupted.

Our postulate of a psychical apparatus that is spatially extended, expediently constructed, and developed according to the needs of life, an apparatus that gives rise to the phenomena of consciousness only in one particular place and under certain conditions, has enabled us to develop the science of psychology on the same sort of basis as any other natural science such as, for example, physics. Here, as there, the task consists of discovering something else behind the characteristics (qualities) of the object of research that are directly given to our perception – something that is more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense-organs and that approximates more closely to what we suppose to be the real facts of the matter. We don't hope to be able to approach these themselves, for we see that everything new that we have inferred has after all to be translated back into the language of our perceptions, from which we simply can't now escape. But this just is the nature and limitation of our science. It is as if we were saying in physics: 'if we could see that clearly, we would find that the apparently solid body consists of small parts of such and such a shape, size, and respective position'. In the meantime, we keep trying with artificial means to improve the effectiveness of our sense-organs to the utmost, although we can't really expect all such efforts to make any difference to the eventual outcome: 'reality' will always remain 'unknowable'. The gain brought to light by scientific work on our

primary sense-perceptions will consist of insights into connections and dependencies that are present in the external world, that can somehow or another be reliably reproduced or mirrored in the internal world of our thoughts, and the knowledge of which enables us to 'understand' something in the external world, to predict it and, possibly, to change it. We proceed in much the same way in psychoanalysis. We have found the technical means that enable us to fill the gaps in the phenomena of our consciousness and we avail ourselves of these means in the same way as a physicist would experiments. In this way, we deduce a certain number of processes that are in themselves 'unknowable', link them with those we are conscious of, and when we say, for example, that 'an unconscious memory has intervened here', then what that actually means is: 'something has happened here that's totally beyond us – but something that could only have been described in such and such a way if it had ever come to consciousness'.

What right we have to draw such conclusions and interpolations, and the degree of certainty we can attach to them remains, of course, open to criticism in each individual case, and we can't deny that it is often very difficult to decide – this difficulty being expressed in the lack of agreement among analysts. The novelty of the task is to blame for this – that is to say, the lack of training; but there is also a particular factor inherent in the subject, for psychology, unlike physics, doesn't always deal with things that can awaken only a cool, scientific interest. Thus we won't be too surprised if a female analyst, insufficiently convinced as to the intensity of her own desire for a penis, doesn't give this factor its due recognition in the case of her patients either. However, such sources of error from the personal element are ultimately of little significance. If we read old textbooks on the use of microscopes, then we are amazed to discover what extraordinary demands were made on the personality of those observers using the instrument in the days when the technology was still new – something that is not mentioned at all today.

We can't set ourselves the task of outlining a complete picture of the psychical apparatus and what it does; even if we were to do

so, we would in any case find ourselves hampered by the fact that psychoanalysis has not yet had time to study all the functions equally. Therefore I shall content myself with a detailed recapitulation of what I told you in the introductory chapter.

The dark *Es*, then, forms the core of our being; it has no direct contact with the external world and is accessible even to our knowledge only as mediated by another entity. The organic *drives* operate in this *Es*; they themselves consist of a fusion between two primal forces (Eros and destruction) that are combined together in varying proportions and are differentiated from one another by their relationship to the organs or organ-systems. The sole thing these drives strive for is gratification, and they expect to arrive at this by way of certain changes in the organs achieved with help from objects in the external world. However, the kind of immediate and heedless gratification of the drives that the *Es* demands would often enough lead to dangerous conflicts with the external world and to extinction. The *Es* is not in the slightest bit solicitous about ensuring the continuation of existence, and it knows no fear – or it would perhaps be more correct to say that it can indeed develop sensory elements of fear, but can't make use of them. The processes that are possible in and between the postulated psychical elements in the *Es* (the *primary process*) differ considerably from those which are known to us through conscious perception in our intellectual and emotional life; moreover, they are not subject to the critical restrictions of logic that rejects some parts of these processes as inadmissible and wants to annul them.

The *Es*, cut off from the external world, has its own world of perception. With extraordinary acuteness, it senses certain changes within itself, especially the fluctuations in the tension of the needs of its drives, which come to consciousness as sensations in the pleasure-unpleasure series. Granted, it is difficult to specify in which ways these perceptions come about and which sensory terminal organs help them to do so. But it is a fact that the self-perceptions – the vital sense, and sensations of pleasure or unpleasure – rule the processes in the *Es* with despotic violence. The *Es* obeys the

unrelenting pleasure principle. This, however, doesn't apply to the *Es* alone. It seems that the activity of the other psychical forces is also capable only of modifying the pleasure principle, not of cancelling it out; and when and how the pleasure principle is overcome at all remains, theoretically speaking, a highly significant question, and one that has not been answered so far. The consideration that the pleasure principle demands a reduction – basically, perhaps, an extinction – of the tension of needs (*nirvana*) – leads to the relationships, as yet unassessed, of the pleasure principle to the two primal forces, Eros and the death drive.

The other psychical force which we think we understand best and in which we are most likely to recognize ourselves, the so-called *Ich*, has developed from the cortical layer of the *Es* which is in direct contact with the external world (reality) by its being set up to receive and exclude stimuli. Starting from conscious perception, it has subjected even greater areas and deeper layers of the *Es* to its influence, and shows in its persisting dependency on the external world the ineradicable stamp of its origins (a bit like, for instance, being marked 'made in Germany'). Psychologically speaking, its job consists of raising the processes in the *Es* on to a higher dynamic level (by, say, transforming freely flowing energy into bound energy, as it corresponds with the preconscious state); what it does for the construction of the psyche is that, between a drive-demand and a gratificatory action, it switches on the faculty of thought, which seeks by means of trial actions to calculate the success of the intended undertakings according to its orientation in the present and its evaluation of earlier experiences. In this way, the *Ich* comes to a decision about whether the attempt at gratification should be carried out or postponed, or whether the demand of the drive might not have to be entirely suppressed as something dangerous (this is the *reality principle*). Just as the *Es* sets out exclusively in search of gaining pleasure, so the *Ich* is ruled by a consideration for security. The *Ich* has set itself the task of self-preservation, which the *Es* seems to neglect, and avails itself of the sensations of fear as a signal that heralds dangers threatening its integrity. Since memory traces can become conscious just as much as perceptions,

especially through their associations with the remnants of language, the possibility exists here of confusion arising that would lead to a misreading of reality. The *Ich* protects itself against this through the device of *reality-testing*, which is allowed to lapse in dreams because of the conditions prevailing while the individual is asleep. Dangers threaten the *Ich* that wants to assert itself against the excessively powerful mechanical forces that surround it, forces that primarily, though not exclusively, come from external reality. Our own *Es* is a source of similar dangers for two different reasons. First, excessively strong drives can damage the *Ich* in a similar way to the excessively great 'stimuli' of the external world. They can't, it is true, destroy it; however, they *can* probably destroy its unique dynamic organization and can turn the *Ich* back into being part of the *Es*. Second, experience may have taught the *Ich* that gratifying a drive-demand that is in itself not intolerable would bring dangers in the external world with it, so that in this way the drive-demand itself becomes a danger. The *Ich*, then, does battle on two fronts: it has to defend its existence against an external world that threatens to destroy it, as well as against an all-too-demanding internal world. It uses the same methods of defence against both, but the defence against the inner enemy is particularly inadequate. As a result of its original identity with the inner dangers and of having lived with them on the most intimate terms since then, it is very difficult for it to escape them. They remain threats, even if they can be temporarily kept under control. We have heard that the weak and immature *Ich* of the first period of childhood is permanently damaged by the stresses imposed on it by its attempts to defend itself against the dangers that are part of this period of life. The child is protected against the dangers that threaten it from the external world by the solicitude of its parents; it pays for this security through a fear of *loss of love* that would deliver it up, helpless, to the dangers of the external world. This factor expresses its decisive influence on the outcome of the conflict when the little boy gets into the Oedipal situation, in which the threat to his narcissism of castration, reinforced by primeval factors, gets the better of him. Driven by the combination of the two influences – the

current, objective danger and the remembered, phylogenetically based, one – the child undertakes his attempts at defence-repressions – that, despite serving a purpose at that moment, none the less prove themselves to be psychologically inadequate if the later revival of the sexual life strengthens the drive-demands that were rebuffed in the past. Viewed in a biological light, the explanation for this would have to be that the *Ich* fails in its task of mastering the excitations of early sexual life – something that it is not qualified to do at this point because of its immaturity. We can see the essential pre-condition for neurosis in the way that the development of the *Ich* lags behind that of the libido, and we can't avoid coming to the conclusion that neurosis could be avoided if the childish *Ich* were spared this task – if, that is, infantile sexual life were granted its freedom as happens in the case of many primitive peoples. The aetiology of neurotic illness is possibly more complicated than is described here; but if that is so, then we have at least chosen to describe an essential thread of the aetiological knot. Nor must we forget the phylogenetic influences that are represented somehow in the *Es* in forms as yet unfathomable to us, and that will certainly have a stronger effect on the *Ich* in that early phase than they will later. On the other hand, it begins to dawn on us that such an early attempt to dam in the sex drive, such a decisively partisan stance on the part of the young *Ich* in favour of the external world as opposed to the internal one as comes about due to the ban on childhood sexuality, can't fail to have an effect on the individual's later cultural adaptability. The drive-demands forced away from direct gratification are compelled to take new routes that lead to substitute gratification and can, whilst taking these diversions, become desexualized and can loosen the connection with their original drive-aims. By saying this, we are anticipating the assertion that much of what our culture possesses and so highly prizes was gained at the expense of sexuality, through restrictions being imposed on sexual driving forces.

If we have had to emphasize repeatedly up to now that the *Ich* has its relationship to the objective external world to thank for its existence as well as for the most important characteristics it has

acquired, we have at least prepared ourselves to assume that sickness – the state in which the *Ich* again most clearly approximates to the *Es* – is founded on this relationship to the external world being relaxed or dissolved. This ties in very well with clinical experience telling us that the trigger for an outbreak of psychosis is either reality becoming unbearably painful, or the drives becoming extraordinarily intensified – which, given the rival claims made by the *Es* and the external world on the *Ich*, necessarily has the same effect. The problem of psychosis would be simple and transparent if *Ich* and reality could be completely separated. But that seems to happen only rarely, perhaps never. Even in states that are so far removed from external reality as, for instance, hallucinatory confusion (amentia) we discover from what the sick people tell us once they have recovered that, while they were ill, a normal person was hiding in a corner of their psyche (as they put it) – a person who, like a detached observer, let the whole illness business pass him by. I don't know if we can assume it always to be thus, but I can report similar things about other psychoses that take a less tempestuous course. I have in mind a case of chronic paranoia in which every attack of jealousy was followed by a dream which brought to the analyst's attention a correct, undeluded version of its trigger. Thus this interesting conflict presented itself: while the dreams of neurotics normally allow us to deduce jealousy that is alien to their waking life, in the case of psychotics we find that the dream corrects the delusions that prevail during the day. We may probably take it to be generally true that what we get in all such cases is a psychical *split*. Two psychical perspectives are formed instead of one single one, the one being the normal one that takes reality into account, and the other being the one that, under the influence of the drives, separates the *Ich* from reality. The two exist alongside one another, and the end result depends on their relative strength. If the latter is or becomes the stronger then this provides the pre-condition for psychosis. If this relationship is reversed, then we find that the delusional illness appears to be cured. In truth, though, it has merely retreated into the unconscious; indeed, countless observations force us to infer that the

delusion was fully formed and lying in wait for a long time before its manifest eruption.

The view that postulates a *splitting of the Ich* in all psychoses could not claim so much attention if it didn't turn out to be applicable to other states which are more similar to the neuroses – and ultimately to the neuroses themselves. I was first convinced of this in cases of *fetishism*. This abnormality, which may be classed as belonging to the perversions is, as is well known, based on the patient – almost always a male – not acknowledging the female's lack of a penis, this being highly undesirable to him as evidence that his own castration is a possibility. This leads him to deny what his own senses tell him, namely that female genitals lack a penis, and he clings to the opposite conviction. The denied perception does not, however, remain entirely without influence, for he still doesn't have the courage to assert that he did actually see a penis. Rather, he seizes upon something else – a part of the body or an object – and confers on it the role of the penis, which he doesn't want to be without. The thing he seizes on is mostly something which he did genuinely see when looking at the female genitals, or something that is a suitable symbolic substitute for the penis. Now, it would be wrong to call this process of fetish-formation a 'splitting of the *Ich*'; it is a compromise-formation aided by the displacement we have come to know about from dreams. But our observations show us yet more. The fetish was initially created in order to eradicate the evidence of possible castration, in order to avoid the fear of castration: if the female, like other living beings, possesses a penis, then there is no need for the male to be anxious about whether he will continue to possess one himself. However, we then encounter fetishists who have developed the same fear of castration as non-fetishists, and who react to it in the same way. Thus their behaviour simultaneously expresses two contradictory premisses. On the one hand they deny the very fact that they perceived – that they saw no penis in the female genitals – and on the other hand, they acknowledge the female's lack of a penis and draw the right conclusions from this. The two attitudes exist alongside one another for the whole of the individual's life, without

influencing one another. *This* is what we can call a *splitting of the Ich*. These facts also allow us to understand why fetishism is so often only partially developed. It does not exclusively dominate the individual's object-choice but leaves space for a greater or lesser degree of normal sexual behaviour; indeed, it sometimes withdraws into a modest role or to a mere allusion. The fetishist has, then, never fully succeeded in detaching the *Ich* from the reality of the external world.

It should not be supposed that fetishism represents an exceptional case with regard to the splitting of the *Ich*: it is simply a particularly suitable object of study for this process. We are returning here to our argument that the childish *Ich*, dominated by the real world, deals with unpleasant drive-demands by means of so-called repression. We can now supplement this with the further remark that, during the same period of life, the *Ich* finds itself often enough in the position of defending itself against a demand of the external world that it experiences as painful; and it does so by *denying* the perceptions that tell it that reality is making this demand. Such denials occur very often – not only in the case of fetishists – and wherever we get into a position to study them, they prove themselves to be half measures, incomplete attempts at detachment from reality. A refusal to accept the perceptions is supplemented every time by an acknowledgement of them; two opposing outlooks, independent of one another, always set themselves up – and this results in the splitting of the *Ich*. The outcome depends once again on which of the two can seize for itself the greater intensity.

The facts of the *Ich* being split, which we have described here, are not as new and strange as they might at first appear. After all, it is a general characteristic of the neuroses that, with respect to some particular behaviour, two different stances, opposed to one another and independent of one another, exist within the person's psyche; the only difference being that the one belongs to the *Ich*, while the opposing one, being repressed, belongs to the *Es*. The difference between the two cases is essentially a topographical or structural one, and it is not always easy to decide which of the two

possibilities we are dealing with in any individual case. However, the important thing they both have in common is the following: whatever the *Ich* undertakes in striving to defend itself – whether it wants to deny a part of the real external world, or to reject a drive-demand of the internal world – the outcome is never a total, complete one. On the contrary, it always gives rise to two opposing stances of which the defeated, weaker one also leads to psychical complications. To conclude, we need only point out how little our conscious perception tells us about all these processes.

Chapter 9: the Internal World

The only way that we can give an account of complex clusters is to describe their various elements one by one. And consequently, all our explanations are initially guilty of being one-sided simplifications, and wait to be filled out, added to and thereby corrected.

The concept of an *Ich* that mediates between the *Es* and the external world, taking over the drive-demands of the one in order to procure their gratification and making perceptions with respect to the other that it uses as memories; the concept of an *Ich* that, in its concern for self-preservation, wards off excessively strong demands from both sides, all its decisions being dictated in the process by the directive of a modified pleasure-principle – this concept actually applies only to the *Ich* as it is until the end of the first period of childhood (around the age of five). At about this time, an important change has taken place. A part of the external world has – partially, at least – been abandoned and has instead been adopted by the *Ich* (through the process of identification); has, that is to say, become part of the internal world. This new psychical authority continues to carry out the functions that those particular abandoned people had performed in the external world: it observes the *Ich*, gives it orders, judges it, and threatens it with punishments – just like the parents whose place it has occupied. We call this authority the *Über-Ich*, and experience it in its judging capacity as our *conscience*. What is striking is that the *Über-Ich*

often develops a severity for which the actual parents have provided no pattern; and also that it calls the *Ich* to account not only for what it does, but also because of thoughts and unfulfilled intentions that the *Über-Ich* somehow seems to be familiar with. This reminds us that the hero of the Oedipus legend, too, feels guilty on account of his deeds and submits to a self-inflicted punishment, even though the compulsion that the oracle put him under ought to acquit him of all blame both in our judgement and in his own. The *Über-Ich* is indeed the legacy of the Oedipus complex and is only set in motion once this complex has been dealt with. Thus its excessive severity doesn't follow an actual model, but corresponds to the strength of the defence used against the temptations of the Oedipus complex. The claims of philosophers and believers that man's moral sense isn't instilled into him by his parents or acquired by him as a member of the community but is infused into him from a higher authority are probably based on an inkling of the Oedipal fact.

So long as the *Ich* works in total harmony with the *Über-Ich* it is not easy to distinguish the manifestations of one from those of the other, although tensions and estrangements between them make themselves very clearly apparent. The agony we feel when our conscience reproaches us precisely corresponds to the child's fear of loss of love which was replaced by its moral authority. If, on the other hand, the *Ich* has successfully resisted a temptation to do something that the *Über-Ich* would find objectionable, then its sense of itself is elevated and its pride is strengthened, as if it had made a valuable acquisition. In such a way, the *Über-Ich* continues to play the role of an external world for the *Ich* – although it has become part of the *internal* world. For the whole of later life, it represents the influence of the individual's childhood – the care and upbringing given to him by his parents, his dependency on them – the childhood that has become so very prolonged in humans because of their living together in families. And it is not only the personal characteristics of the parents that come into play in this process but everything else that has had a determining effect on *them*, too: the proclivities and expectations of the social milieu in

which they live; the dispositions and traditions of the race they come from. Someone who preferred to make general assertions and sharp distinctions might say that the external world in which the individual finds himself exposed when he has detached himself from his parents, represented the power of the present; the *Es*, with its inherited tendencies, represented the organic past; and the *Über-Ich*, the later addition, represented above all the past of the whole civilization that the child is meant to relive, as it were, in the short span of its early period of life. Such generalizations can't easily be generally correct. Some part of our cultural inheritance has certainly left its traces behind in the *Es*; much of what the *Über-Ich* contributes will awaken an echo in the *Es*; the effect of all kinds of things that the child experiences freshly will be intensified because these things are repetitions of some ancient phylogenetic experience. ('You have to *earn* what you have inherited from your fathers, to make it your own'.[13]) Thus the *Über-Ich* occupies a kind of middle ground between the *Es* and the external world; in it, the influences of past and present are unified. With the inception of the *Über-Ich*, one has as it were a lived experience of the way in which the present is converted into the past.

(1940)

Notes

1. This oldest part of the psychical apparatus remains the most important throughout one's entire life. Psychoanalytical research also took this as its starting point.
2. Poets have fantasized about similar things, though nothing that corresponds to this is known from the history of living substance.
3. The philosopher Empedocles of Acragas was already familiar with the portrayal of the basic forces or drives, which many analysts still resist.
4. Cf. the supposition that humans are descended from a mammal that became sexually mature at the age of five. According to this view, the straight course of sexual development was disturbed at around that age by some great external influence. Other changes in the sexual life of humans

in comparison to animals could be connected with this, such as, say, the disappearance of the libido's periodicity and the role played by menstruation in the relationships between the sexes.

5. The question arises as to whether the gratification of purely destructive drive-impulses can be felt as pleasure; whether pure destruction can occur without the addition of the libido. Gratification of the death-drive that has remained in the *Ich* seems not to provoke sensations of pleasure, although masochism represents a blending quite analogous to sadism.

6. Early vaginal excitations are often reported; however, this is very probably a case of *clitoral* excitation – that is, excitation in an organ analogous to the penis. This does not stop us being justified in calling the phase 'phallic'.

7. One extreme branch of thought, exemplified by American behaviourism, believes it can found a psychology that ignores this basic fact!

8. The analogy would be a non-commissioned officer who has just silently accepted a reprimand from his superior taking out his anger about this on the first unsuspecting private he comes across.

9. [The contradiction here (that this condition be fulfilled *both* beforehand *and* afterwards, followed by the remark that the child *either* recalls having seen the female genitals *or* sees them later on) is Freud's own.]

10. Castration is not missing from the Oedipus legend, either – for the blindness with which Oedipus punishes himself for his crime is, according to the evidence of dreams, a symbolic substitute for castration. We can't exclude the possibility of a phylogenetic memory-trace being partly responsible for the extraordinarily terrifying effect of the threat – a memory-trace from the prehistory of the primal family, when the jealous father really did rob the son of his genitals if the latter became burdensome for the woman's affections. The ancient custom of circumcision, an alternative symbol for castration, can only be understood as an expression of the son's submission to the father. (Cf. the primitives' puberty rites.) The form taken by the course of events described above in peoples and cultures where childhood masturbation is not suppressed has not yet been investigated.

11. The name 'William Shakespeare' is very probably a pseudonym hiding a great unknown. A man who is thought by some to be the author of Shakespeare's plays, Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, lost his beloved and admired father when he was still a boy and completely broke off all relations with his mother, who remarried very soon after her husband's death.

12. ['If the little savage were left to his own devices, such that he retained all his imbecility, and such that he joined to his childish paucity of reason

the violent passions of a man of thirty, then he would strangle his father and sleep with his mother', Denis Diderot, *Le neveu de Rameau* (1774). I am grateful to John Reddick and Gerry McCarthy for their great 'teamwork' (to coin a good German expression) on this French translation!]

13. [Goethe, *Faust*, Pt. I, Sc. I.]